Papers:
In this paper I develop a new interpretation of Kant’s argument from geometry. The interpretation is based on distinguishing the roles of pure versus applied geometry in the argument from geometry. Once these roles are properly distinguished I argue that Kant’s argument from the geometry can be understood in a way that avoids the problems with modern physics which are often taken to refute it.
Kant’s claim that mathematical judgments are synthetic a priori plays a crucial role in his transcendental philosophy. The key to this claim is the idea that mathematics requires intuition. In this paper I present an account of the role of Kantian intuition in mathematics. I claim that Kant believes that mathematics requires intuition because of the role intuition plays in his account of the applicability of mathematics to appearances.
Frege's Transcendental Logic This paper is concerned with the relationship between Kant’s and Frege’s conceptions of logic. This issue is crucial to understanding the sense in which Frege’s purely logical development of arithmetic constitutes a reply to Kant’s original view on which arithmetic requires intuition. Traditionally it is Kant’s general logic that is used to compare with Frege’s. In contrast, I approach the comparison from the perspective of Kant’s transcendental logic. In the paper I find that Frege’s logic shares similar epistemological goals with Kant’s transcendental logic. In this sense we see a kind of continuity between Kant and Frege. This allows us to compare their views in a new light and also sheds a new perspective on Frege’s position in the analytic tradition.
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